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EXEMPTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE: 
WILL THEY SWALLOW THE DIRECTIVE? 
STEPHEN A. OXMAN 
Abstract: This Note analyses the probable effectiveness of the 
European Union Data Protection Directive, which was passed in 
order to curtail the invasion of personal privacy that has 
accompanied the development of the Internet, in light of three 
potentially expansive exemptions contained within the Directive. The 
author concludes that the goals of the Directive will be achieved only 
if Member States interpret these exemptions restrictively when 
enacting legislation pursuant to the Directive. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Personal data" is any information relating to an identifiable per-
son. I It includes both basic factual information pertaining to an indi-
vidual's identity, such as his or her name, address, and social security 
number, and information revealing an individual's personal prefer-
ences, such as records of purchases or visits to websites.2 The process-
ing and exchange of personal data has increased dramatically due to 
rapidly advancing technological resources, such as the Internet.3 This 
technology has been a boon to entities such as direct marketers, jour-
nalists, and law enforcement officials, who rely on acquiring this in-
formation in order to achieve their objectives.4 
The widespread access to personal data facilitated by new tech-
nology increasingly has been viewed as a serious threat to personal 
privacy.5 The European Union (EU) Directive on the Protection of 
\ Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 
2(a), 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive]. 
2 See id.; Leslie A. Kurtz, The IImisible Becomes Alallirest: Illformatioll Plillacy in a Digital 
Age, ~~8 WASHBURN LJ 151,152-53 (1998). 
3 See Directive, sllpm note 1, \·ec. 4. 
4 See Craig Martin. Mailillg Lists, Mailboxes, alld the IlIlIasioll of Plillacy: Finding a Contme-
tllal SOllitioll to a Tmnsllational Problnn, :~5 Hous. L. REv. 801, 802 (1998). 
5 See Patrick]. Murray, ThR Adequacy Stalldard Under Directille 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data 
Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ 9:~2, 9:~3 (1998). 
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Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data (the Directive), which came into 
effect on October 24, 1998, represents the first major international 
legislative effort to curtail this intrusion.6 
At the time the Directive was passed, some individual European 
countries, such as Germany, already had passed their own legislation 
regulating the processing of personal data.7 Disparities among these 
various regulations, however, created potential obstacles to the free 
flow of personal data among Member States.s The purpose of the Di-
rective, therefore, was to create EU-wide privacy rights that would re-
move those obstacles and harmonize the transfer of personal data 
within the ED.g 
The Directive is designed to regulate the collection, storage, use, 
and dissemination of personal data. IO It embraces the right to privacy 
as a fundamental right and seeks to give the individual control over 
the distribution of his or her personal data.!1 The Directive provides 
data subjects with a number of rights with respect to their personal 
data, including: (1) the right of access to data;12 (2) the right to with-
hold permission to use data;13 (3) the right to have inaccurate data 
rectified;14 and (4) the right of recourse in the event of unlawful 
processing of data. 15 The Directive also provides that personal data 
may not be transferred to third countries unless the recipient country 
is deemed by the European Commission (Commission) to have ade-
quate privacy laws.16 The Directive directs Member States to adopt 
their own legislation implementing the provisions of the Directive,17 
and to create their own supervisory bodies to monitor the application 
of the laws adopted pursuant to the Directive. ls 
Although the Directive provides comprehensive protection for 
personal data privacy, it also recognizes that "[t]here must be a bal-
6 See Fred H. Cate, Tlte EU Data Protection Directive, Information Pl7vacy, and the Public In-
terest, 80 IOWA L. RE\,. 431, 4,H (1995). 
7 See Murray, slljHa note 5, at 933-34. 
8 See Directin', supra note 1, ref. 7. 
9 See id. ref. 8. 
10 See Murray, supra note 5, at 942. 
11 See Dh-ective, supra note 1, ref. 2. 
12 See id. art. 12. 
13 See id. art. 14. 
14 See id. art. 6. 
15 See id. art. 22. 
16 See Directive, sulml note 1, art. 25. 
17Id. art. 32. 
18 Id. art. 28. 
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ance between the right to be let alone and the legitimate interests of a 
society. "19 Therefore, the Directive exempts from its reach the proc-
essing of personal data when the societal interests in that data out-
weigh the subject's interest in personal privacy.2o When personal data 
are processed for certain enumerated purposes, the Member States 
may permit derogation from the strict privacy requirements of the 
Directive.21 Many of these exemptions were drafted in broad terms in 
order not to infringe on the abilities of the Member States to legislate 
in the interests of their citizens.22 
The Directive specifically states the legislature's intent to give 
Member States a "margin for manoeuvre" when implementing their 
own personal data privacy legislation.23 This "margin for manoeuvre" 
has the potential to undermine effective enforcement of the privacy 
principles on which the Directive is hased.24 In addition, the deroga-
tions that Member States are allowed to permit under the Directive 
potentially could undermine the Directive's goal of harmonization of 
data privacy laws in the EU.25 
This Note focuses on the shortcomings in three categories of ex-
emptions enumerated in the Directive. Part I of this Note examines 
the category of exemptions contained in Articles 3(2) and 13, which 
exempt from the scope of the Directive all activity falling "outside the 
scope of Community law," such as actions necessary to safeguard na-
tional security or actions pertaining to criminal proceedings.26 Part II 
focuses on the Article 13(2) exemptions, which exempt activities that 
are conducted solely for research purposes.27 Part III considers Article 
26, which contains exemptions from Article 25.28 Article 25, arguably 
19 Ulrich U. "Vut>nneling. Harlllollisation of Ell m/Jea II Unioll Privacy Law. 14]. MARSHALL 
]. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411. 414 (1996). 
20 See Working Party on tht> Prott>ction of Indi\'iduals with Regard to tht> Processing of 
Personal Data. Transfers of Personal Data 10 Third COllI/flies: A/J/JZ),ing Articles 25 and 26 of the 
EU Dala Pmlection Directive, adoptt>d 011 July 24. 1998. ch. 5. http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/ dgl5/ en/medial dataprot/\\vdocs/\\vI2t>n.htm (last visited No\,. 17, 1999) [he1'e-
inafter Transfers J. 
21 See Directive, SIt/Jm nott> 1. arts. 13. 26. 
22 See Spiros Simitis, Fmlll Ihe Mar/wt to the Polis: The Ell Dill'ctillt' on the Pmtection of Pnc 
sonalData, 80 10\\'A L. RE,·. 445. 451 (1995). 
23 See Dirt>ctivt>, sujJ/'{l note 1, rec. 9. 
24 See Simitis, sll/Hunott> 22, at 451 (arguing that political prt>ssures for accommodating 
existing laws in tht> Mt>mber States post> a threat to a high level of protection). 
25 See Directive, slIjJ/'{l note 1, rec. 9 ("within the limits of this margin for manoeuvre ... 
disparities could arise in the implt>mentation of the Directivt>"). 
26 fd. arts. 3(2}, 13. 
27 See id. art. 13(2}. 
28 See Cate, slljJra note 6, at 437. 
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the most controversial provision of the Directive, prohibits Member 
States' firms from transferring personal data to third countries that 
lack adequate privacy laws.29 Article 26 exempts parties from Article 
25 if the transfer is pursuant to a contract or if the transferor adduces 
adequate safeguards by the transferee. 3o Following a description of 
each of these exemptions, this Note suggests ways that Member States 
should interpret and implement these exceptions so as to avoid sub-
verting the goals of the Directive. 
I. ARTICLE 3 (2) EXEMPTION 
The most sweeping exemption to the Directive is contained in 
Article 3 (2), which states that the Directive "shall not apply to the 
processing of personal data ... in the course of an activity which falls 
outside the scope of Community law. "31 These activities, according to 
the Directive, include "processing operations concerning public secu-
rity, defense, State security (including the economic well-being of the 
State when the processing operation relates to State security matters), 
and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law. "32 While these 
examples give some guidance as to what types of personal data the 
Commission intended to cover with this exemption, the Directive 
does not strictly delineate the scope of EU law in this context, thereby 
leaving the exemption open to potentially divergent interpretations 
by the Member States. 33 
The Directive further extends this exemption by granting Mem-
ber States the right to adopt legislative measures to restrict the obliga-
tions and rights provided to the data subject under the Directive in 
these areas.34 In order to "avoid any negative consequences for the 
restrictive policies of most Member States," this provision deliberately 
leaves it up to the Member States to determine the scope of these re-
strictions.35 In the exemption for areas of criminal law, for example, 
the Directive enumerates every aspect of police activity with "astonish-
29 See Directive, sujJra note 1, arts. 25, 26. 
30 See id. art. 26. 
31 !d. art. 3(2). 
32 fd. arts. 3(2), B. 
33 See Simon Chaiton, The Transposition into UK Law ofEU Direr/ive 95/16/EC (the Data 
Protection Directive), 11 INT'L RE\,. OF L. COl\lPUTERS & TECH. 25, 26 (1997). 
34 See Directive, sllpra note 1, art. 13. 
35 Simitis, suj}/'({ note 22, at 459; see also Rohert M. Gellman, Call Priv{I(Y be Regula/I'd Ef 
feflive~v on a Na/ional Level? Though/s Oil /he Possible Seed for In/ema/iollal PriJl(IlY Ru/fs, 41 
VILL. L. REv. 129, 148 (1996). 
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ing meticulous [ness] " in order to give the States the broadest discre-
tion possible in restricting the scope of the Directive.36 
Authorities in the Member States could interpret these provisions 
as license to infinitely restrict the data subject's right of access in these 
areas. 37 This interpretation is particularly likely because data privacy 
has been a low priority ill most Member States.38 Because the Member 
States are concerned chiefly with the efficient operation of their po-
lice forces, they have "never particularly welcomed the data subjects' 
right to know" when it potentially could interfere with this 
efficiency.39 Thus, local authorities could restrict access to data in any 
situation that they could claim was remotely related to national secu-
rity or to a criminal proceeding.4o 
England, for example, validates this concern. The Data Protec-
tion Act 1998, England's legislative enactment pursuant to the Direc-
tive, provides a similar exemption to that contained in the Directive.41 
It provides that the data subject shall not have the right of access to 
the data if the data are processed for the purpose of "preventi[ng] or 
detecti[ng] a crime" or "apprehen[ding] or prosecuti[ng] ... of-
fenders."42 Thus, England has not defined the scope of the restric-
tions at all, as the Directive suggests it should, but rather has passed 
this determination on to the data processors themselves.43 Further-
more, the English law seems to exceed the restrictions allowed under 
the Article 3 (2) exemption by providing that personal data processed 
for the enumerated purposes does not need to be processed "fairly 
36 See Simi tis, supm note 22, at 460. 
37 See Jacqueline Klosek, The Development of /ntl'rnatiolla/ Po/ice CoojJel"ation Within the Elf 
and Between the EU and Third Part)' States: A. DisCllssioll of the Lega/ Bases of Sitch Coapemtion and 
flU' Problems and Prolllises !?Pslt/ling ThRreof, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. RE\,. 599, 645 (1999) (arguing 
that the Directivt' provides little practical protection to individuals concerned about police 
use of personal data). 
38 See Simi tis, supm note 22, at 460. 
39/d. 
40 See id.; Klosek, slljJm note 37, at 645. 
41 See Data Protection Act 1998, 1998 cit. 29, § 29, hltp:/ / \\ww.legislation.ltmso.gov. 
uk/acts/actsI998/19980029.htm (Jul. 24, 1998) [hereinafter DPA]; Directive, .wpm note 
1, art. 13(1). 
42 DPA, supm note 41, § 29. 
43 See id. 
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and lawfully."44 This additional restriction, which is not mandated by 
the Directive, practically courts violations of personal data privacy.45 
According to Professor Spiros Simitis, the first data protection 
commissioner in the German State of Hesse,46 the Commission's re-
fusal to define the scope of these restrictions was a mistake.47 Simitis 
argues that what is really needed are rules clearly stating that the data 
subject's right to access can "never be totally excluded, but rather can 
at most be partially restricted or temporarily suspended in a series of 
unequivocally defined and exhaustively listed cases. "48 The Directive, 
on the other hand, leaves it up to the Member States to enumerate 
these cases.49 
Niall Perry, head of Information Technologies with the Mid-
Bedfordshire, England District Council, recently stated that, although 
he realized that he would be exempt from some of the requirements 
to seek consent of the data subject as a requirement for processing 
data, he would "probably seek consent as a belt-and-braces thing. "50 
While Perry's intent is admirable, it may not reflect the pervading at-
titude among the Member States towards compliance with the Direc-
tive.51 
On one hand, the Member States must be able to protect na-
tional security and conduct criminal investigations in an efficient 
manner,52 and the need to obtain the subject's consent for all process-
ing of personal data could hinder these efforts.53 On the other hand, 
national and local authorities with license to infinitely restrict privacy 
rights in any case that they choose could lead to a Big Brother situa-
tion in which citizens are defenseless against governmental intrusions 
into their personal spheres.54 Such routine flouting by a Member 
State of the principles on which the Directive is based not only could 
threaten the privacy rights of its citizens, but also could hamper the 
44 See id. (providing that personal data processed for the purposes of "preventi[ng] or 
detecti[ng] a crime" or "apprehen[ding] or prosecuti[ng] ... offenders" are exempt from 
the first data protection principle, which provides that "personal data shall be processed 
fairly and hmfully."). 
45 See id. 
46 See Gelhnan, sujJra note 35, at 167. 
47 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 460. 
48Id. 
49 See Directive, supra note 1, art. 13. 
50 Alison Classe, Pmtection Racket, COMPUTER WKLY.,Jllne 10, 1999. 
51 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 460. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See Klosek, supra note :~7, at 645. 
2000] The Personal Data Pli7lacy Directive 197 
effectiveness of the Directive by showing other Member States that it 
is possible to comply technically with the Directive while ignoring the 
privacy principles on which it is based.55 
II. ARTICLE 13(2) EXEMPTION 
Article 13(2) contains another potentially broad exemption. It 
states that Member States may restrict the data subjects' rights of ac-
cess to data when the data are processed "solely for purposes of sci-
entific research or ... for the sole purpose of creating statistics. "56 U n-
like the sweeping exemption for criminal proceedings, the Directive 
places limits on this exemption in an attempt to balance the rights of 
data subjects against the need for scientific and sociological re-
search.57 First, Member States' restrictions are "subject to adequate 
legal safeguards, in particular that the data are not used for taking 
measures or decisions regarding any particular individual. "58 Second, 
the restrictions must pose "no risk of breaching the privacy of the data 
subject."59 Finally, Member States may only restrict a data subject's 
right of access for statistical purposes when the data are kept by the 
processor "for a period which does not exceed the period necessary 
for the sole purpose of creating statistics. "60 
Although these restrictions narrow the scope of the Article 3(2) 
exemption, the exemption actually is quite broad because it does not 
enumerate the types of "research purposes" to which it applies.61 All 
public or private institutions with their own research departments 
theoretically could fall within the exemption.62 Furthermore, any 
business seeking to avoid the restrictions of the Directive could simply 
establish its own "research" department.63 
The provision in Article 3 (2) stating that the exemption applies 
when data are processed "solely for research purposes" appears to pro-
hibit the use of data collected for research purposes outside the realm 
of research.64 This prohibition is particularly important when sensitive 
55 See id.; Simitis, slIjJra note 22, at 460. 
56 Directive, supra note 1, art. 13 (2). 




61 SeeSimitis, slIjJra note 22, at 457. 
'62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 SeeDirectiYe, slljmlilote I, art. 13(2) (emphasis added). 
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data are involved, as in medical or criminological research.65 Article 
6 (l) (b), however, provides that "further processing" may be allowed 
"provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards. "66 The 
Directive does not define "appropriate safeguards," nor does it indi-
cate which types of measures might be considered as such.67 There-
fore, "the Member States will probably keep the door open for uses 
other than research and thus unnecessarily erode the protection of 
the data subjects in the name of improved research conditions. "68 
Another provision that appears to limit the scope of the exemp-
tion is a provision providing that the rights of the data subject may be 
restricted for research purposes "subject to adequate legal safeguards, 
in particular that the data are not used for taking measures or deci-
sions regarding any particular individual. "69 The effectiveness of this 
provision may be minimal, however, given its inherent vagueness.70 
For instance, it does not state expressly whether other uses still are 
permitted. 71 In addition, it neglects to define "measures or deci-
sions. "72 Vague provisions such as this one jeopardize the efficient 
protection of the privacy of data subjects. 73 
If the privacy principles advocated by the Directive are to have 
any force, the Member States must not permit unbridled interpreta-
tions of these types of provisions.74 In their legislative enactments pur-
suant to the Directive, the Member States should enumerate exactly 
which research purposes fall under the exemption.75 In addition, they 
should create clear and strict limits on the ability to use research data 
for purposes other than research. 76 At the very least, Member States 
should define, or provide guidelines for determining, what constitutes 
"adequate safeguards" and "measures or decisions. "77 
65 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 459. 
66 Directive, .5Ilpra note 1, art. 6(1) (b). 
67 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 458. 
68 fd. 
69 Directive, sujJra note 1, art. 13(2). 
70 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 459. 
71 See id. 
72 /d. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 457-58. 
75 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 457-58. 
76 See id. at 458. 
77 See id. at 459. 
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III. ARTICLE 26 EXEMPTION TO ARTICLE 25 
Article 25 of the Directive contains the important provision that 
no data processor in a Member State shall transfer personal data to a 
third country unless that country "ensures an adequate level of pro-
tection. "78 This provision is meant to address the fact that if personal 
data from a country with privacy regulations can be transferred freely 
to a country with no privacy rules, the legal protections available in 
the source country may be lost. 79 According to Article 25, whether or 
not a third country provides an "adequate level of protection" shall be 
assessed "in light of all the circumstances." 
[P] articular consideration shall be given to the nature of the 
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation, ... the country of origin and country of final des-
tination, the rules of law ... in force in the third country 
and the professional rules and security measures which are 
complied with in that country.so 
The Member States and the Commission must inform each other of 
cases where a third country does not provide an adequate level of 
protection.81 Then the Commission may determine whether the third 
country has failed to ensure adequate protection.82 If the Commission 
determines that adequate protection is lacking, the Member States 
must prevent transfers of data to the country in question.83 
Many countries, including the United States, lack what the 
Commission would deem an "adequate" level of data protection legis-
lation.84 However, an absolute ban on the transfer of personal data to 
these countries would pose a serious trade barrier or even a data or 
information embargo.85 "Information sharing now takes place on an 
international scale and involves a tremendous amount of data refer-
ring to individuals. "86 Information regarding credit transactions, for 
example, flows routinely from the country where charges are in-
78 Directive, slIpra note 1, art. 25(1). 
79 See Gelhnan, slI/)ra note 35, at 158. 
80 Directive, slI/)ra note 1, art. 25(2). 
81 Seeid. art. 25(3). 
82 !d. art. 25(4). 
83 See id. 
84 See Gellman, slI/)ra note 35, at 158; Paul M. Schwartz, Ellroj)1'a1l Data Protection Law 
and Restrictions on Intematiollal Data Flows, 80 10\\'.'1. L. REv. 471, 472 (1995). 
85 See Murray, supra note 5, at 938. 
86 Schwartz, supra note 84, at 471. 
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cUlTed to the country where the bill is ultimately sent.87 A broad ban 
on the transfer of data to third countries, such as the United States, 
would be "disruptive, expensive and, seemingly, unlikely."88 
In light of these economic realities, the Directive provides certain 
exemptions to this provision of Article 25.89 There is considerable un-
certainty, however, concerning how the Member States will interpret 
and apply some of these provisions.90 
Perhaps the most ambiguous exemptions to the "adequate pro-
tection" requirement are the "contract exemptions" contained in Ar-
ticle 26(c) and (d).91 They provide that a Member State may allow the 
transfer of data to a country that does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection when the transfer is necessary for the performance of a 
contract that either is between the data subject and the controller or 
is between the controller and a third party if the contract is "in the 
interest" of the data subject.92 These exemptions are likely to apply, 
for example, to transfers necessary to reserve an airline ticket for a 
passenger or to transfers of personal data necessary for the operation 
of an international bank or credit card payment.93 They also would 
apply to multinational corporations that make contracts with local 
subsidiaries in order to enable their personnel records to be moved.94 
In a paper adopted on July 24, 1998, the Working Party on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data (the Working Party), an organization established by the Directive 
to analyze the Directive's provisions and to issue opinions and rec-
ommendations to the Commission on matters relating to data protec-
tion, suggests that although the Article 26(c) and (d) exemptions ap-
pear generous, the requirement that all of the data transferred be 
necessary for the performance of the contract is likely to limit them.95 
The Working Party optimistically believes that "if additional non-
essential data are transferred or if the purpose of the transfer is not 
the performance of the contract but rather some other purpose (fol-
low-up marketing, for example) the exemption will be 10st."96 
87 See Gellman, sll/n-a note 35, at 161. 
88 ld. at 158. 
89 See Directive, supra note 1, an. 26. 
90 See Gellman, supra note 35, at 157. 
91 Directive, supra note 1, art. 26(e) & (d). 
921d. 
93 See Transfers, supra note 20, eh. 5. 
94 See Tim Phillips, Data Protection-A Question of Privacy, COMPUTING, July 8, 1999. 
95 See Transfers, supra note 20, eh. 5. 
96 ld. 
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The Working Party overlooks the inherent ambiguities contained 
within the Article 26(c) and (d) exemptions.97 What is "necessary" for 
the performance of a contract is not defined.98 In addition, what con-
stitutes a contract "in the interest" of the data subject is left to the in-
terpretations of the Member States.99 Although the Working Party at-
tempts to delineate the scope of "interest" by saying that it would 
coyer transfer of data about the beneficiaries of bank payments who 
may not be party to a contract with the transferring controller,lOO the 
Directive itself provides no such illustrations.10l This lack of specificity 
may allow data processors to ignore restrictions on third country 
transfers through subjective determinations of what contracts are in 
the interests of the data subject.102 An EU company that enters into a 
contract to sell the personal data of a European citizen to a direct 
marketer in the United States, for example, reasonably could assert 
that the contract is "in the interest" of the person since the direct 
marketer could be considered a provider of "valuable" goods or serv-
ices to the data subject.103 
The ambiguities contained in the Article 26(c) and (d) exemp-
tions offer a practical method for EU companies to avoid the restric-
tions of Article 25.104 Business publications already have begun sug-
gesting that companies use the exemptions in order to circumvent the 
legislation. l05 The exemptions obviously are important for preventing 
obstacles to the free flow of trade between EU and non-EU co un-
tries.106 If the Directive is going to protect privacy effectively, however, 
it is equally important that Member States clearly define the limits of 
these exemptions and apply them unifonnly.107 By enumerating the 
types of contracts that may fall under this exemption and by defining 
what constitutes an "interest" of the data subject for purposes of the 
97 See id. 
98 See Directive, supra note I, an. 26(b) & (c). 
99 See id. art. 26. 
100 See Transfers, supra note 20, ch. 5. 
101 Sl'eDirective, su/)mnote I, al·t. 26(c). 
102 See id. 
103 Srl'id. 
104 SeeClasse, sll/)ra note 50; Phillips, supra note 94. 
105 See Tado Lyons, Don't Ignore Data Protection 011 the H't>b, H'rmls Tarlo Lyons, M2 Press-
wire,July 29, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis LibraJ'Y, UK Wire Sen'ice Stories; Classe, sll/)ra 
note 50; Phillips, sllpra note 94. 
106 See Transfers, sll/)m note 20, ch. 5 (stating that Al:tide 26(1) exemptions concern 
cases where public interests override the data subject's right to privacy). 
107 See Simitis, supra note 22, at 458-59. 
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exemption, the Member States would ensure that the Directive is not 
cast aside in the interest of trade relations. !Os 
Another ambiguous exemption to Article 25's "adequate level of 
protection" requirement for transfers to third countries is found in 
section 2 of Article 26.109 This section provides that a Member State 
may authorize the transfer of data to a third country which does not 
ensure adequate protection where "the controller adduces adequate 
safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and funda-
mental rights and freedoms of individuals. "110 The purpose of this 
provision is to balance the free flow of information with the right to 
privacy by assessing adequacy in the context of each particular trans-
fer, rather than on a per country basis. III However, the Directive does 
not define "adequate safeguards. "112 Although it attempts to give 
guidance as to what constitutes an adequate safeguard by providing 
that the safeguards "may in particular result from appropriate con-
tractual clauses," this language merely creates further ambiguity be-
cause the phrase "appropriate contractual clauses" is not defined.l13 
The Directive leaves it up to the data processors to give meaning to 
these terms in case-by-case analyses.1l4 This process can be cumber-
some1l5 and may provide data processors, who are already antagonis-
tic to privacy regulation,116 with another reason to overlook or ignore 
the terms entirely. 
Member States can avoid overly liberal interpretations of this ex-
emption by clearly delineating which safeguards, in addition to the 
use of contractual clauses, may be deemed adequate by the data con-
troller. Furthermore, a clear definition of what constitutes "appropri-
ate contractual clauses" would avoid reliance on subjective determina-
tions in determining which contracts may evade the scope of the 
Directive. 
108 See id. at 459. 
109 See Direnive, slijJra note 1, arl. 26(2). 
110 Ir!. art. 26(2) (emphasis added). 
11l See Mllrray, sltjJra note 5, at 997. 
112 See Directive, sltjJm note 1, art. 26(2). 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Mllrray, sltjJra note 5, at 997. 
116 See Classe, slt/Jm note 50. (Dr. Simon Murdoch of amazon.com.uk says, "The whole 
concept of a restriction on information about individuals going outside the EU bothers 
me."). 
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CONCLUSION 
The ED Data Privacy Directive cannot effectively protect personal 
data privacy unless Member States implement the Directive responsi-
bly and vigilantly. To that end, Member States must interpret the po-
tentially expansive exemptions to the Directive restrictively if the goals 
of the Directive are to be achieved. First, Member States' legislation 
should limit the exemptions for national security and criminal pro-
ceedings to a set of clearly defined cases. Next, Member States should 
limit the exemptions for research purposes by employing more de-
tailed legislative provisions than are found in the Directive, 
specifically with regard to what constitutes research purposes and 
what uses beyond research purposes are permitted once information 
is collected. Finally, Member States should curtail the exemptions to 
the "adequacy" requirement for transferring data to third countries in 
order to prevent the exemptions from serving as a general "escape 
route" for companies seeking to send personal data outside the ED. 
The exemptions to the Directive are drafted broadly in order to give 
the Member States room to maneuver in implementing them. It is 
important, however, that the Member States use this room not to fur-
ther expand the exemptions, but rather to strictly define their scope. 
